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Being software security one of the primary concerns in the software engineering community, researchers are coming up with many preemptive approaches which are primarily
designed to detect vulnerabilities in the post-implementation stage of the software development life-cycle (SDLC). While they have been shown to be effective in detecting vulnerabilities, the consequences are often expensive. Accommodating changes after detecting a
bug or vulnerability in late stages of the SDLC is costly. On that account, in this thesis, we
propose a novel framework to provide an additional measure of predicting vulnerabilities
at earlier stages of the SDLC. To that end, we leverage state-of-the-art machine learning
classification algorithms to predict vulnerabilities for new requirements. We also present
a case study on a large open-source-software (OSS) system, Firefox, evaluating the effectiveness of the extended prediction module. The results demonstrate that the framework
could be a viable augmentation to the traditional vulnerability-fighting tools.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation
With the ubiquitous adoption of the software systems in our lives, software security is

becoming a real concern. Unfortunately, the attack surface is widening manifolds with this
wider adoption of the software in many areas. Numerous events of security breaches are
being reported every year despite making security one of the highest priorities in developing software. The consequence of such events could be unprecedented. For instance, as
the New York Times [53] reported, Google Plus, the social media wing of Google, is going
offline after a vulnerability exposed private data of nearly a million users. Another security
breach was reported last year which exposed sensitive information of nearly 143 million
American consumers due to a vulnerability in Apache Struts serialization technique [16].
Apart from the incidents receiving wide media attention, mostly due to the high number of
victims and the compromised target being from major tech players, such as Google, there
are numerous other incidents of security exploits being reported every year [49]. These
reports attest to the fact that any software system, be that from a heavyweight player or
simply an innocuous personal website, is subject to security vulnerabilities. As such, software security is becoming a very active research area and researchers are more and more
aggressively pursuing solutions to build a secure system.
1

Traditionally the software engineering community practiced a reactive approach to deal
with vulnerabilities [37]. It is based on the “fix as soon as a vulnerability is detected”
philosophy [37]. The drawback with this approach is that it often leads to an improvised
solution of the problem at hand for the little time that it allows. In addition, it might
further imply that damage has already been done before a patch is deployed [32, 39].
Besides, detecting vulnerabilities requires expertise in both the specific software product
and software security in general [34], prompting the researchers to look for automated tools
and more proactive approaches. These approaches are dominated by static and dynamic
analysis of the code and machine learning techniques [43]. They are largely designed to
work at the post-implementation phases of the software development life-cycle (SDLC).
The product is tested for the presence of vulnerabilities during testing or other late phases
of the SDLC once the implementation is complete.
While proactive approaches have demonstrated success in detecting vulnerabilities, it
often comes with a price. A vulnerability discovered later in the SDLC is more expensive
to fix than the one discovered early [8]. Besides, any change to a developed product is
often expensive, time-consuming, and sometimes infeasible given the major design or architectural revamping it might demand [43, 26]. Therefore, it is more desirable to prevent
the introduction of a vulnerability in the first place, than discovering and fixing it later [35].
To that end, we propose a novel framework capable of predicting vulnerabilities as early as
during the requirement engineering (RE) stage of SDLC. In particular, we propose reusing
existing software artifacts, such as requirements, vulnerability reports, and source code, to
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develop a general understanding of the associations between requirements and vulnerabilities and using this knowledge to provide useful pointers for new requirements.
Our proposed framework can open several new avenues towards software security. It
can guide developers to avoid typical vulnerabilities experienced with existing implementation of similar requirements. The framework can assist RE activities as the requirements
engineers can restructure new requirements in a more precise manner being aware of potential vulnerabilities stemming from a specific type of requirement. Our framework can
also help in testing activities by indicating typical vulnerabilities experienced in certain
types of requirements. In addition, this framework can aid project management activities
by identifying security-intensive requirements and facilitating an effective distribution of
workload among developers/security engineers possessing certain skills.

1.2

Central Hypothesis
In this proposal, aiming to complement traditional approaches, we present a novel

framework that advocates the idea of automatically predicting potential vulnerabilities
as early as during RE. In particular, we propose building a direct mapping between requirements and vulnerabilities from data freely available over issue tracking systems, code
repositories, and vulnerability databases. To that end, we envision leveraging requirement to source code tracing techniques, including textual similarity [14], Vector Space
Model (VSM) [38], Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI) [31], and Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) [7], as well as scraping vulnerability to source code links from known vulnerability
database, such as CVE1 . Our framework further proposes feeding this mapping to a pre1

https://cve.mitre.org/
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diction module that anticipates potential vulnerabilities for a new requirement, employing
ML techniques, such as Logistic Regression [46], Support Vector Machine [56], and Naive
Bayes [12] or examining its similarity with existing vulnerability-inducing requirements.
The proposed framework involves two major stages: building a direct association between requirements and vulnerabilities (R-to-V mapping), and predicting vulnerabilities
leveraging that mapping. In the first stage, we obtain a R-to-V mapping by applying traceability techniques on raw data mined from software repositories. The prediction module in the next stage is expected to learn this direct association information between requirements and vulnerabilities in order to assess the potential vulnerability risks in new
requirements. In particular, we incorporate state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) classification algorithms, such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), Logistic Regression (LR),
Naive Bayes (NB), Random Forest (RF), K-Nearest-Neighbour (KNN), Artificial Neural
Network (ANN), and Decision Tree (DT) [25, 48, 15], in prediction module in order to
learn the associations between requirements and vulnerabilities obtained in last step and
predict vulnerabilities for future requirements based on that knowledge. Next, in order to
evaluate the efficacy of the ML techniques in predicting vulnerabilities, we further present
a case study on Firefox [20], a widely used major web browser. While the study reveals
that the prediction module is yet to reach a perfect state in terms of producing high vulnerability coverage and low false positives, it provides very promising results. Our ensemble
of classifiers achieves a low precision and a high vulnerability coverage. In particular, it
predicts one out of every three predictions correctly on an average per-requirement with
42% recall.
4

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Existing literature advocates both reactive and proactive approaches towards security.
Reactive approaches are traditionally practiced and driven by the philosophy of ‘recovery’
rather than ‘prevention’ [37]. As the vulnerability is detected post-release of the software,
security patches are developed as compensation to recover the discovered weakness. As it
is evident, the weakness can already be compromised by the attackers before a ‘recovery’
action is undertaken [32, 39]. To that end, the software community feels a pressing need for
proactive approaches that advocate ‘prevention’ of a vulnerability. Along that line, many
proactive solutions have been proposed, largely dominated by static and dynamic analysis
of the code and machine learning techniques [43]. In what follows, we will review some
of the previous studies conducted in order to take on the vulnerabilities proactively.

2.1

Static and Dynamic Analysis of Code
Static analysis refers to the examination of code structure without actually executing it,

whereas dynamic analysis refers to the inspection of program behavior at runtime. Along
this line, researchers have proposed several techniques to detect known vulnerability signatures in the code. For instance, Huang [22] uses a combination of static and dynamic
analysis to detect use-after-free vulnerabilities in every plausible execution traces of a con5

current program. Livshits et al. [28] employ a static analysis technique to match the userspecified vulnerability signature in the program. Medeiros et al. [33] explore the use of a
combination of static analysis and data mining to discover vulnerabilities in source code
with fewer false positives. They combine taint analysis, which finds candidate vulnerabilities, with data mining, to predict the existence of false positives.

2.2

Machine Learning Techniques
Apart from the static and dynamic analysis-based techniques, a number of ML-based

techniques have been proposed. In general, ML algorithms are trained with features of
vulnerable and non-vulnerable software components that include different software metrics and source code textual features. The objective is to recognize vulnerability in newlywritten code or component based on such metrics. Most of these proposed techniques are
binary classifiers in nature [43], i.e., identify ‘vulnerable’ and ‘non-vulnerable’ components. For instance, Shin et al. [47] investigated the effectiveness of the traditional fault
prediction metrics, such as complexity, code churn, and fault history. Their case study on
Firefox achieved a low precision (12%) for a high recall (83%). Similarly, Chowdhury
et al. [12] investigated the efficacy of the complexity, coupling and cohesion metrics as a
vulnerability predictor by conducting a case study on Firefox. They achieved 75% recall
with a false positive rate of 30%.
Along that line, other works such as [37, 56] reported the effectiveness of different
software metrics in predicting vulnerabilities. Neuhaus [36] capitalized on the fact that
components sharing similar imports or function calls as vulnerable components are more
6

likely to be vulnerable. Scandariato et al. [43] trained their model with token frequencies
or textual features to achieve the same goal as others. For ML-based predictive models
to be effective in practice, there must be a good set of already discovered vulnerabilities.
L.K.Shar et al. [45] proposed a method aiming to overcome the initial need of existing vulnerability reports by using a combination of static, dynamic analysis and machine learning
techniques to develop a model to address this drawback of predictive models.
A common theme among these existing approaches is that they all use features related
to the source code. As such, these approaches are capable of predicting vulnerabilities
post-implementation of the software. However, the late changes are usually expensive in
terms of both cost and time [43, 8, 26]. Besides, the root of a vulnerability can often be
traced back to the earlier stages of SDLC, such as requirement engineering (RE) and design phases [46]. In response to these drawbacks, we propose a framework to minimize the
introduction of vulnerabilities in the first place as much as possible. It can influence developers’ activity during RE, design, and early implementation phases. Developers can be
made watchful of the typical vulnerabilities encountered in the past from the implementation of similar requirements. Knowing the common security pitfalls, a certain requirement
implementation may fall for, requirement engineers can be more informative and precise in
structuring requirements or designers can include necessary security modules to be taken
care of at latter stages, such as implementation. It can offer insights to the test engineers in
preparing test cases during functional testing or testing against requirements.
The framework does not intend to replace the traditional approaches. Rather, it is
designed as a “preventive mechanism” to complement them. Even with the preemptive
7

guideline, a vulnerability might still exist. A developer might not just pay attention to the
warnings issued or could introduce other vulnerabilities unintentionally. This is where the
traditional approaches will come in handy. In other words, the proposed framework is designed to minimize the likelihood of introducing vulnerabilities during implementation by
taking advantages of the fact that some vulnerabilities can be prevented with a meticulous
formulation of software requirement specification, where traditional approaches still have
an important role to play at the end of the implementation.
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CHAPTER 3
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

3.1

Big Picture
Figure 3.1 shows the big picture of the proposed framework. The framework is tailored

at the end of the RE phase in the software development life cycle (SDLC) in contrast
to traditional approaches, which are typically tailored at the end of implementation and
testing phases as illustrated in Figure 3.2.

Start

Requirement Gathering &
Analysis
Deploy &
Maintenance

Design

Testing

Implementation

Guide

Predict

Guide

Figure 3.1: Big picture of the proposed framework.

It should be noted that we use “detect” keyword instead of “predict” for the traditional
approaches as they look to uncover existing hidden vulnerabilities in implementation. On
the other hand, the proposed framework forecasts future vulnerabilities that might be introduced during implementation.
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Design
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Figure 3.2: Big picture of the traditional approaches.

3.2

Framework Activities
We group the activities in the framework into two major stages: i) building a direct

association between requirements and vulnerabilities (R-to-V mapping), and ii) predicting vulnerabilities. All the activities involved in the framework have been captured in
Figure 3.3. The end product of the first stage is a requirement-to-vulnerability (R-to-V)
mapping dataset which is to be used in the second stage. This mapping is created by mining and engineering the raw data scraped from the software repository. The prediction
module then develops an understanding of the general relationship between the requirements and vulnerabilities by learning the direct associations between them obtained in the
previous stage. In what follows, we will detail the associated activities and components of
the framework.

3.2.1

Requirement-to-Vulnerability Mapping

An important aspect of our framework hinges around the idea of building a direct mapping between the requirements and vulnerabilities that appeared in the source code real10

Source code
artifacts

Requirements

Collecting
requirements
and source
code artifacts

Pool of
requirements
and source code
artifacts

Vulnerability
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Building
candidate
requirementto-source code
links

Collecting
vulnerability
and source
code
information

Vetting
mechanism

Vulnerability to
source
code links

New requirement
Mapping
requirement to
source code

Mapping
requirement to
vulnerability

Mapping
dataset

Requirement-to-vulnerability (R-to-V) mapping module

Predicting
vulnerabilities

Predicted
vulnerabilities

Prediction module

Figure 3.3: Proposed framework.

izing those requirements. In modern world, we have free access to a vast array of software artifacts, such as requirements over the issue trackers, source code for OSS systems,
and vulnerabilities detected in particular code artifacts documented in known vulnerability
databases. Building upon this fact, we propose establishing a link between requirements
and vulnerabilities by capturing data contained in such documents. In reality, a direct
connection between a requirement and a vulnerability is not normally documented in an
explicit manner. However, our preliminary investigation on the aforementioned documents
suggests that source code can act as an intermediate entity in this context. In other words,
identifying the code artifacts that realize a requirement and the vulnerabilities associated
with those artifacts can help us build such a direct connection. Based on this basic idea,
we devise a five phase solution, discussed next, to develop our mapping.

3.2.1.1

Data Collection

In order to prepare the final mapping, the framework begins by collecting raw software
artifacts, such as requirements, vulnerability reports, and source code. In this work, in
order to demonstrate the activities in the framework and evaluate the performance of the
11

ML-based techniques in the prediction module, we use Firefox as a subject system. Firefox
is a major web browser developed by The Mozilla Foundation [1] which has been identified
as the second-most popular desktop browser [1]. It marked its first release in 2004. Being
here for nearly two decades, Firefox has amassed a huge user base, numerous incidents of
security issues, and abundant requirements. The availability of the publicly accessible raw
data makes it a suitable subjects system for our case study.
Firefox, being an OSS system, publicly maintains the source code, an issue tracking
system, and regularly publishes vulnerability reports in their security advisory [1]. Firefox
security advisory publishes vulnerability report in great detail, including relevant source
code revisions. Moreover, the developers at Firefox follow a convention of including the
issue ID in their commit messages to the version control system (VCS). By taking these
advantages, we perform a straightforward process of crawling the vulnerability reports,
searching through VCS commit messages to collect required raw data.

Subject
Firefox
Tomcat

# Vulnerability # Source Files # Vulnerable Source Files
738
261494
1874
181
Table87
3.1: Demographics2237
of the Collected Data

#
Subject Requirements

Firefox

23885

#
#
Vulnerable Vulnerability
Requirements
8019

687

#
Source
Files
50541

#
Vulnerable
Source
Files
1283

Tomcat total collected requirements: 1398

Table 3.1 shows the demographics of the collected data. In total, we collect 23885
random requirements and 687 vulnerabilities from the version 4.0.1 to 65. It should be
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noted that the demographics reflect only the vulnerabilities and requirements for which a
traceable link to the corresponding source code file(s) could be established. Furthermore,
in this work, we loosely use the term requirement to indicate any change request in the
issue tracking system.

3.2.1.2

Linking requirements to source code

In this phase, our framework starts with downloading the source code and scraping the
requirements from online resources. This activity is guided by the vulnerability database
(cf. Figure 3.3) in the sense that we choose the subject system based on the availability
of a detailed documentation of its vulnerabilities and associated code artifacts. Next, our
objective is to build candidate links between requirements and source code with the help
of some automated mechanisms. To that end, we propose to leverage the concept of traceability [19] in RE, i.e., following the life of a requirement in both forward and backward
direction. Lately, a number of information retrieval (IR) based traceability techniques, including VSM [38], LSI [31], and LDA [7], have been proposed for retrieving links between
existing software artifacts [2, 31, 20], with some showing impressive results for requirements to source code tracing [30]. Inspired by such findings, we propose using proven IR
techniques to build our candidate links.
Potential challenges: Traceability techniques rely on a major assumption that programmers use meaningful names for program items, such as functions, variables, types, classes,
and methods [2], and a consistent terminology is used throughout the project’s life cycle [30]. In addition, these IR techniques demonstrate a trade-off between precision and
13

Source code
artifacts

Vulnerabilities

R1

SCA1

V1

R1

V1

R2

SCA2

V2

R2

V2

R3

SCA3

V3

R3

V3

Requirements

IR techniques

(a)

Mined from software
repository

Rn
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Final requirementto
vulnerability mapping

Figure 3.4: Mapping requirements to vulnerabilities.

recall [13]. None of them, so far, generates links with a perfect precision [13]. With an
aim to address this challenge, following traditional traceability techniques, we further introduce vetting from human analyst at this stage of our framework in order to finalize the
requirements to source code links (cf. Figure 3.3). The arrows between requirements and
source code artifacts in Figure 3.4-a indicate these finalized links. It should be noted that
we introduce human analyst as a supporting mechanism that could potentially be ignored
if we want to allow a high tolerance for false positives. Such a high tolerance, however,
may generate a lot of false alarms, thereby compromising the efficiency of our framework.

3.2.1.3

Linking vulnerabilities to code artifacts

Modern vulnerability databases includes a comprehensive list of known vulnerabilities
along with associated revision IDs. This information can directly lead us to the exact code
artifacts in the version control system that were changed to address a particular vulnerability. Therefore, the activities we propose at this step of our framework involve a fairly
14

straight forward engineering task of scraping such information that allows us to directly
build connections between those vulnerabilities and code artifacts. The arrows between
vulnerabilities and source code artifacts in Figure 3.4-a conceptualizes our notion of links
between vulnerabilities and code artifacts.

3.2.1.4

Requirement-to-Vulnerability Mapping

After generating the aforementioned two types of links, we have the source code artifacts serving as a bridge between requirements and vulnerabilities, thereby allowing a
direct requirement-to-vulnerability mapping. As an illustration, in Figure 3.4-a, IR techniques retrieve a link between requirement R3 and source code artifact SCA1 . Whereas,
vulnerability database indicates an association between V1 and SCA1 . Considering SCA1
as the intermediate bridge, our operationalization declares a direct mapping from R3 to V1
(cf. Figure 3.4-b).
After building the mapping for the collected Firefox data, we found 33.6% of requirements to be associated with some vulnerable software component (cf. Table 3.1). We call
the rest of the 66.4% requirements as ‘clean’ requirements as they are not found to be
associated with any vulnerable source code.
An important limitation of our proposed approach is that, in its current form, it can
not deal with vulnerabilities associated with a code artifact that are not yet recorded in the
vulnerability database. To that end, we envision applying more sophisticated techniques,
such as exploring associations between code features and vulnerabilities, instead of solely
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relying on vulnerable code reports, will allow us to mitigate this issue. In the future, we
plan to conduct further investigation along this line.

3.2.1.5

Creating Requirement-to-Vulnerability Type Mapping

The requirement-to-vulnerability (R-to-V) mapping obtained from the last step cannot be used for training the ML algorithms directly. R-to-V maps a requirement to an
unique instance of the reported vulnerabilities, i.e., CVE [1] ID in our case. CVE is a
publicly accessible vulnerability database which assigns an unique ID to every instance
of reported vulnerabilities in its database. CVE being commonly acknowledged by the
software engineering community, security advisories usually provide a reference to the
corresponding CVE entry in its vulnerability reports. In the mapping procedure, we too
use the CVE ID to refer to the vulnerabilities. However, for ML classification algorithms
to be able to predict a target class, the dataset must lose uniqueness of the target classes.
If not, every requirement in the training and test data would have an unique label leading classification algorithms to believe that 100% of the predictions for the test dataset
have been made wrong. Therefore, we further refine R-to-V data by assigning an appropriate label to every vulnerability. To that end, we obtain a mapping of CVE entries to a
security taxonomy. Along this line, we make use of another parameter, Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [1] ID. CWE maintains a community-developed taxonomy of
common software-security weaknesses. Both the CVE and CWE is maintained by a U.S.
government-sponsored research and development center, National Cybersecurity FFRDC,
operated by the MITRE corporation [1].
16

CWE maintains security taxonomies from three different perspectives: research concept, development concept, and architectural concept. The research concept organizes
security weaknesses according to the abstractions of software behaviors. The architectural concept prioritizes the software designer’s and architect’s point-of-view. On the other
hand, the development concept organizes the weaknesses to reflect the developer’s pointof-view. In other words, it emphasizes how a weakness can be located in the code, how it
appears, and at what phase of the SDLC it appears. The proposed framework should work
with any of these taxonomies. However, in this work, we are focused on aiding system
implementers, testers, and developers. Therefore, we choose the taxonomy organized by
development view. In the CWE development view, there are nearly 800 categories in total.
However, we restrict the mapping to only the top 21 categories in the hierarchy to compensate for the insufficiency of training data to every category. Table 3.2 briefly introduces the
top categories.
We obtain the mapping to this taxonomy by mining another public vulnerability database
known as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [1], directly maintained by the US
government organization NIST[1]. NVD provides additional analysis to the CVE entries
including a reference to the corresponding CWE category for most of the CVE records. We
perform a straightforward process of mining NVD analysis for the collected CVE entries
to build final requirements-to-vulnerability type mapping.

17

Table 3.2: CWE security taxonomy by development concept
CWE ID

Title

Description

16

Configuration

Weaknesses introduced during the configuration of the software

19

Data Processing Error

Typically results from inadequate data validation

21

Pathname Traversal and Equivalence Errors

Allowing access to restricted path or modification of restricted files

189

Numeric Errors

Improper calculation or conversion of numbers

254

Security Features

Issues related to authentication, access control, confidentiality,
cryptography, and privilege management

361

Time and State

Improper management of time and state

389

Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes

Fault in software error handling

399

Resource Management Errors

Improper management of system resources

417

Channel and Path Errors

Improper handling of communication channels and access paths

429

Handler Errors

Improper management of handlers

438

Behavioral Problems

Unexpected behavioral change in API

840

Business Logic Errors

Weaknesses allowing manipulation of application business logic

442

Web Problems

Weaknesses specific to web applications

355

User Interface Security Issues

Weaknesses related to user interface

452

Initialization and Cleanup Errors

Troubles in initialization or cleanup

465

Pointer Issues

Improper handling of pointers

490

Mobile Code Issues

Weaknesses frequently found in mobile code

559

Often Misused: Arguments and Parameters

Improper use of arguments or parameters within function calls

569

Expression Issues

Weaknesses in incorrectly written expressions within code

657

Violation of Secure Design Principles

Violation of well-established principles for secure design

1006

Bad Coding Practices

Unsafe coding practices
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3.2.2

Predicting Vulnerabilities

At this stage, the objective of the framework is to develop a prediction module leveraging historical knowledge, i.e., R-to-V mapping acquired in the previous phase, to make
an informed prediction for new requirements. As an illustration, if a new requirement
Rn is found to be similar to R2 by the framework, V2 should be predicted for this new
requirement as a potential vulnerability as R2 has been known to result in V2 in the past
(cf. Figure 3.4-b). Capitalizing on known vulnerability information, such outcomes of the
framework are expected to guide future development endeavors.
For the prediction task, a range of techniques including IR-based or ML-based techniques could be used. However, the naive IR-based techniques, such as VSM, LDA, and
LSI mostly work based on textual similarities, and are unable to capture semantic information present in documents written in natural languages, such as requirements [30]. Considering limitations of naive IR-based techniques, we adopt state-of-the-art ML-techniques
employed in the context of vulnerability prediction [37] for prediction task. In what follows, we will discuss the activities involved in the ML-based prediction module in detail.

3.2.2.1

Problem Formulation

It is natural that a certain requirement would impact multiple software components or
multiple changes in a same component which may potentially result in producing multiple
vulnerabilities. Such a scenario has been demonstrated in Figure 3.4-b. For instance, R1
has a mapping with both the vulnerabilities V2 and V3 . As a consequence, the prediction
module must be aware of the possibility of multiple vulnerabilities being associated with a
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requirement and be able to predict such cases. A problem where a sample can be associated
with multiple labels or classes is known as a multilabel classification problem [55].

3.2.2.2

Data Preprocessing

A clean and balanced dataset is a prior condition of building a reliable machine learning
model. As the models will be trained on the requirement documents containing natural
language, the requirements need to go through a number of cleaning procedures. Besides, a
balanced dataset with proportional class distributions is also very important for developing
a reliable model. To that end, this section describes the preprocessing procedures we follow
before feeding the data to the machine learning algorithms. The preprocessing activities,
in turn, can be grouped into two major tasks: i) data cleaning, and ii) data balancing.
I) Data Cleaning: Cleaning raw textual data is a very important step for ML algorithms
to be able to tune performance based on relevant domain corpus. Irrelevant words or common words such as, ‘is’, ‘am’, and ‘at’ add no special meaning to the context of problem
domain we are considering, the presence of which might unnecessarily skew the accuracy
of ML algorithms. A sequence of cleaning activities we performed on the raw dataset have
been listed below.
i) Removing special characters: Punctuation, special characters, such as ‘\n’, ‘\r’, and
‘\t’, and ascending characters are removed from the requirement documents.
ii) Removing non-alphabetic words: Non-alphabetic words, such as numbers, are removed.
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iii) Expanding shortened and abbreviated words: Shortened English words, such as
‘I’m’,‘you’ve’ and abbreviated words such as ‘info’ to ‘information’ or ‘doc’ to ‘document’
are expanded.
iv) Removing stop words: Very frequently used common English words such as ‘the’,
‘a’, ‘on’, and ‘in’ are removed.
v) Removing programming keywords: Common programming keywords such as ‘int’,
‘float’, and ‘print’ are removed as well.
vi) Stemming: Words are reduced to its root form using porter stemmer [41].

Figure 3.5: Original class distribution.

II) Data Balancing A dataset where the distribution of samples per class varies by a
wide margin is known as class imbalance problem. There are many problems which are,
by nature, an instance of an imbalanced class problem [5]. For instance, the detection of the
21

Figure 3.6: After grouping infrequent classes.

Figure 3.7: After applying sampling.
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fraud email or spam is such an example. Only a small fraction of emails are identified as
fraud. Machine learning algorithms suffer a hard time learning the imbalanced dataset [47].
They tend to learn only the majority classes, ignoring the minority classes to achieve higher
accuracy [6]. For example, in the problem of spam detection, if spam is accounted for only
10% of the whole dataset, ML algorithms would find it advantageous to learn other 90%
non-spam emails. In such a case, they will still achieve 90% accuracy if they always predict
‘non-spam’ class, ignoring ‘spam’ class altogether. Therefore, it is very important to adjust
class distributions to avoid biases towards majority classes.
The problem we are dealing with, by nature, is an example of imbalanced class problem. Among all the requirements, only a small fraction of them results in a vulnerability.
An investigation on the collected data further confirms this assumption. We found only
33% of the requirements we collected for Firefox to be associated with vulnerabilities.
Besides, Figure 3.5 shows the class-wise requirements distribution for the collected data.
We can see that dummy class ‘clean’, which represents the requirements with no link to
vulnerability is the majority. It also clearly shows the acute class imbalance [5] issue in
the dataset. For instance, the ratio between class ‘16’ and ‘19’ is only 1.26%. In order
to build a reliable prediction model [47], dealing with acute imbalance is of paramount
importance. To that end, we apply various techniques designed to deal with the imbalance
issue. In what follows, we will briefly discuss these techniques.
i) Grouping Infrequent Classes: The smaller classes such as the ones with CWE ID
‘438’, ‘389’, ‘21’, and ‘452’ have very few samples for an ML algorithm to learn the
classes well. Oversampling, a technique to increase infrequent data samples, such classes
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comes with a price of huge increase in total dataset size leading to a considerable increase in training time [4]. Moreover, in a multilabel setup, oversampling can exert little
control over the distributions of the classes [10]. Therefore, we create another dummy
label,‘other’, to represent the infrequent classes. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution after
grouping infrequent classes.
ii) Sampling: As the distribution of classes in Figure 3.6 is still imbalanced, we apply
another technique known as sampling. Sampling is a very useful tool in data science to
adjust the class distribution in an imbalanced dataset. There are two types of sampling
techniques applied in general: oversampling, and undersampling.
a) Oversampling: Oversampling is a process of increasing number of samples either by simply replicating existing samples or by creating synthetic samples in minority
classes. However, a simple replication may lead to overfitting of the training data [21].
To avoid the problem with simple replication, the literature has proposed various sophisticated techniques to create synthetic data. The synthetic minority oversampling technique (SMOTE) [11] is one such tool which demonstrated a great success in many applications [21]. SMOTE uses K-nearest-neighbor algorithm to create synthetic samples along
the line joining any or all of the k nearest neighbors of a minority sample [11]. We employ SMOTE algorithm to oversample minority classes in our dataset. However, SMOTE
has not been designed to work directly with a multilabel classification problem [11]. The
problem we are trying to solve in this work is one of the multilabel classification problems
which will be explained in detail in the next section. Therefore, we apply a problem trans-
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formation technique called ‘label powerset’ [55] that converts a multilabel problem into an
instance of a multiclass problem to be able to apply SMOTE [10].
b) Undersampling: Undersampling is a process of decreasing number of samples either by simply randomly deleting existing samples or by removing noisy samples chosen
through a systematic analysis from majority classes. The process of random deletion has
a clear disadvantage. It may remove potentially information-rich samples leading models
to miss important concepts [21]. In order to overcome this, a number of informed undersampling techniques have been proposed. We use a technique known as the edited nearest
neighbor (ENN) to clean the noisy samples from majority classes [54]. ENN removes
samples which do not agree enough with their nearest neighbors.
In general, oversampling methods perform better than undersampling techniques in
terms of classification accuracy [6]. However, applying oversampling alone may involve
invasion of majority class into minority class space or vice-versa which may lead to overfitting of the training dataset. To overcome this, a combination of an oversampling and
undersampling technique is used where an undersampling operation follows an oversampling operation which allows the former to clean the noises introduced by the latter [6].
SMOTE+ENN combination is known to work best when positive samples are the minority [6]. As we mentioned earlier, vulnerable classes, which are positive samples, in our
dataset are the minority. In this regard, we combine the oversampling technique, SMOTE,
and the undersampling technique, ENN together as proposed by Batista et. al. [6, 5]. Figure 3.7 shows the distribution after applying sampling techniques. We see that the ratios
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between classes have improved after the operation. For example, the ratio of ‘16’ and ‘19’
becomes 41% from 1.26% in Figure 3.6.
iii) Imbalanced Learning: While sampling techniques improve the class distributions
in a good proportion, they might not make the classes symmetrical. It is due to the fact that
sampling techniques are designed to work directly with multilabel data [10]. Therefore,
a precise control over the distribution of actual classes is not possible while the dataset
is converted to a multiclass format. To compensate the asymmetrical class distributions
still present after applying sampling techniques, we leverage the advantage of weighted
learning. Weighted or cost-sensitive learning has been proven to be a viable alternative
to sampling techniques [21]. We use balanced weight as a cost for the classes. In this
technique, a mistake by learning algorithm is weighed heavily for the minority classes.

3.2.2.3

Model Selection

Having identified the problem in concern to be an instance of the multilabel types, we
will briefly introduce the techniques available in the literature to approach a multilabel
problem and the techniques we choose to employ in our prediction module.
Traditional supervised learning algorithms, by design, solve a binary or multiclass classification problem where a sample is exclusively associated with a single label [55, 9].
They don’t support multilabel problem straight away. The approaches proposed in the
literature to solve them can be categorized into three groups: problem transformation techniques, algorithm adaptation, and ensemble methods [29]. The problem transformation
techniques convert multilabel dataset into binary or multiclass dataset making it suitable
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for standard binary or multiclass classification algorithms. On the other hand, adaptation
methods aim to modify binary or multiclass algorithms directly to work with a multilabel dataset. In terms of selecting an algorithm, the problem transformation techniques
provide more leverage than adaption methods as transformation techniques are algorithm
independent [52], whereas a limited number of algorithms have been adapted for this job
so far [29]. Keeping that in mind, we employ problem transformation techniques in this
study to be able to assess performances of the state-of-the-art classification algorithms in
this context.
There are three types of transformation technique proposed in the literature: binary
relevance, classifier chain, and label powerset [55, 29]. A brief introduction to these techniques is included below:
I) Binary Relevance: It transforms the multilabel problem into a set of binary classification problems. This technique doesn’t take inter-dependency among labels into consideration.
II) Classifier Chain: It also converts the multilabel format into a set of binary classification formats. However, unlike binary relevance, it builds classifiers in a chain. It
includes label dependency information in a particular order. However, labels might have a
dependency in a different order than the order in which classifiers are chained.
III) Label Powerset: In this technique, the problem is transformed into a multiclass
problem by treating each unique combination of labels as a different class. Unlike the other
two techniques, it considers inter-label dependency completely. However, the number of
unique combinations increases exponentially with the increase of labels.
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Both the binary relevance and classifier chain convert the original problem into an
instance of binary classification, while label powerset converts into a multiclass classification. Building upon this fact, we are able to choose from a range of standard binary
and multiclass classifiers, such as Decision Tree, Random Forest (RF), Naive Bayes (NB),
Artificial Neural Network (ANN), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Logistic Regression
(LR), and K-Nearest-Neighbor (KNN) [25, 48, 15].
Through a number of trials and experimentation with the aforementioned classification
techniques, we found Naive Bayes and feed-forward Neural Network to perform poorly
in predicting vulnerabilities. In addition, we observed that different classifiers are predicting different classes strongly. Some are able to capture some labels better than others
which leads us to consider a technique called ensemble of classifiers. It combines different classifiers together to capitalize on the combined strengths of the classifiers. Also, the
ensemble technique is known to outperform single classifiers in most of the cases in the
literature [25]. To that end, we employ a voting based soft and hard ensemble technique [3].

3.2.2.4

Validation Technique

It is very important to estimate how well a model will generally perform on the unseen dataset. K-Fold Cross-validation (CV) is one such widely used technique in this
regard [18]. In this technique, the dataset is split into ‘K’ equal folds. The model is trained
based on the nine folds, leaving one out for validating the model’s accuracy. This process
is repeated ‘K’ times, treating every fold in turn as a test set in ‘K’ iterations. Finally, an
average of the performance estimators is taken for all ‘K’ runs. This procedure helps to
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see the performance of the model beyond the overfitting problem. In our experiment, we
use ten-fold CV which has been shown to be better than other variants of cross-validation
techniques [18, 24].
However, for an imbalanced classification problem as ours, a stratified version of CV
is preferable [25, 17]. In stratified sampling, an equal proportion of classes are distributed
across every fold. To that end, we use a technique proposed by Sechidis et. al. [44] and
Szymaski et. al. [50].

3.2.2.5

Evaluation Metrics

The metrics to be used in a multilabel setup are fundamentally different from the binary
or multiclass setup [9]. In a multilabel setup, a classification is no longer a hard wrong or
right. It can be fully correct, partially correct or incorrect altogether. On that account,
a variety of evaluations measures for multilabel classification have been proposed in the
literature which is grouped into two categories based on the classification task: examplebased, and label-based [55, 29]. Example-based metrics evaluate the system’s performance
on each input instance separately, whereas the latter one evaluates the system’s performance on each target label separately and then micro-/macro-averaging against all class
labels [55]. From a range of available metrics in both the categories, we choose hamming
loss, precision, and recall in different averaging format to evaluate the performance in our
study, a brief introduction to which included below:
I) Hamming Loss: Hamming loss measures the percentage of the instance-label pairs
misclassified. As an illustration, let us consider a hypothetical prediction for an example
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where it is originally labeled with four labels, and the prediction made for this example
misses any of the four classes. In this case, 75% of the labels predicted accurately out of
four original labels, 25% of pairs have been misclassified. Therefore, The hamming loss
would be 25%.
II) Precision and Recall: The precision is the fraction of the relevant items among all
selected items and recall is the fraction of relevant items selected from the actual set of
relevant items. In a multilabel setup, they are computed in three different ways as follow:
i) Macro average: In macro, the precision and recall are computed for every label
individually and finally averaged. It gives equal weight to every label [27].
ii) Micro average: Micro-average provides a system-wide performance overview irrespective of how individual label or class performed. It favors majority classes [27].
iii) Samples average: Samples-average provides an online overview of the model’s performance. Instead of the labels, precision and recall are calculated sample- or requirementwise. A final average is taken by diving with a total number of samples in the test dataset.
The metric is adopted from a Python ML library, ‘scikit-learn’ [40].
The framework is designed as a guide, aiming to drive requirement formulation, implementation, and testing in a secured manner. In this regard, false labeling wouldn’t hurt
much as there is little harm in being extra-cautious. Comparatively, not missing a label
is more important toward our philosophy. Keeping that in mind, we consider micro metrics to be most closely reflective of our goal. However, despite the importance we put
on micro metrics as it reveals the overall system performance, we find the macro metric
to be useful as well. Having identified the problem we are trying to solve as one of the
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imbalanced learning problems, macro serves a purpose in that regard. Macro highlights
the performance of infrequent classes. Too low macro performance compared to micro
indicates that mostly majority classes performed well [27]. The goal is to achieve as better micro performance as possible by maintaining a decent macro performance or average
class performance.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULT AND DISCUSSION

In this chapter, we present the results for our case study and discuss some sample predictions in detail in order to demonstrate practical implication of the proposed framework.

4.1

Result
In this section, we present the results for our case study. We only include result from

the ‘label powerset’ technique which outperformed the other two techniques. It agrees with
the general consensus in the literature that incorporating label correlations information is
very important for the success of the multilabel classification task [42]. It indicates the
existence of correlations among vulnerability types. If a requirement produces multiple
types of vulnerability, they are likely to be co-occurring for other requirements as well.
After a series of trials, we found a voting-based ensemble of Random Forest, KNearest-Neighbor, Decision Tree, and Logistic Regression to be producing the best result.
We experimented with both the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ voting strategy. Both of them performed
well in some certain aspect. Table 4.1 shows the averaged performance over a ten-fold
stratified cross-validation for both the voting strategy.
From the result, we can see that soft ensemble achieves higher vulnerability coverage
than the hard ensemble. Soft ensemble covers 64% of all vulnerabilities, while hard en32

Table 4.1: Performance measures

Class
569
417
840
19
442
16
465
other
clean
1006
399
189
254
361
Macro avg.
Micro avg.
Samples avg.
Hamming loss

Soft Ensemble
Hard Ensemble
Precision Recall Precision Recall
2%
20.4%
2.2%
11%
2%
17%
2%
8.3%
5%
46%
6%
20%
35.1%
78%
34.3%
34%
9%
45%
9%
15.4%
1%
14%
1%
3%
1%
12%
1%
2%
21%
7%
1%
5%
59.1%
5%
55.3%
53.4%
1.2%
13%
1%
6%
22.1%
68.4%
23%
29%
5%
47%
4%
15.3%
19%
69%
19.2%
30.4%
7%
50%
7%
23%
Gross
14%
35%
12%
18.3%
14%
44%
23.4%
36.3%
16%
33%
36%
42%
37%
21%
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Support
30
26
95
628
159
8
9
6
979
12
392
71
341
121
2878
2878
2878
2878

semble covers 28% of them. On the other hand, soft ensemble recognized only 5% of
the ‘clean‘ requirements, whereas hard combination fetched 54% of them. We can also
see that soft configuration reports a higher rate of false positives than its counterpart. In
that regard, there is no clear winner between the two. The choice depends on priorities.
If the goal is to practice maximum caution in regards to building a secure software, soft
ensemble could be the desired configuration. However, as it is evident from the micro
precision it achieved, soft combination ends up with predicting higher false labels. On
the other hand, although hard ensemble achieved lower vulnerability coverage, it produce
fewer false alarms. The ‘clean’ requirements are naturally a majority in a software project
which is also indicated by the class distributions of the collected Firefox dataset. It is
desirable that the framework would be able to avoid attaching false vulnerability labels
to an actual ‘clean’ requirement while maximizing the vulnerability coverage as much as
possible. Hard ensemble is closer on that account than the soft ensemble.
Hard ensemble performs better in terms of samples average and hamming loss as well.
It incorrectly classifies only 21% of the all sample-label pairs, while soft strategy misses
37% of them. Hard ensemble also performs superior to its counterpart in sample-wise
or requirement-wise metrics. It predicts one correctly out of every three predictions per
requirement on an average. It covers nearly half of the true labels on an average for every
requirement.
Looking by the performance of individual classes, we see that classes with higher samples in the training data such as ‘19’, ‘399’, ‘clean’, ‘254’, ‘840’ and ‘361’ performed
better. Classes with less than 1000 samples such as ‘417’, ‘16’, ‘465’, ‘other’, and ‘569’
34

performed worse. The classes such as ‘16’, ‘465’, ‘1006’, and ‘other’ performed worst
both in terms of precision and recall. It can be attributed to the fact that those classes have
very low support count. Support count for a class refers to the number of requirements
in the test dataset belonging to that class. Understandably, the classes with lower support
count are more likely to underestimate as the algorithms would have a limited number of
samples to test with.

4.2

Discussion
As discussed earlier, a vulnerability prediction made by the framework for a particular

requirement implies that the implementation for that requirement should be checked for
that type of vulnerability. In other words, it says that the implementation for the requirement could impact a source code artifact which has been known to be a victim of that type
of vulnerability in the past. It is reasonable to issue a warning while working on a certain
source file against the types of vulnerabilities it has been reported to host as the modification of it could potentially reopen those vulnerabilities. In order to demonstrate how the
predictions can be utilized in practice, here, we include the analysis of certain predictions
for some of the requirements made by the framework. These requirements were not included in the training dataset. Please refer to Table 4.1 for further insights about CWE
IDs.
Requirement ID: 1499615, Prediction: CWE-361
Remark: It impacts the source file, MediaDecoderStateMachine.cpp which has been
found to be associated with CVE-2015-0836, a vulnerability of type CWE-361. The rec35

ommendation made by the framework is emboldened by the fact that the issue has been
suggested by a static analysis tool for having a security implication [1].
Requirement ID: 1236600, Prediction: CWE-361
Remark: It impacts the source file, CodeGenerator.cpp which has been found to be
associated with CVE-2013-5609, a vulnerability of type CWE-361. The recommendation
made by the framework is emboldened by the fact that the manual analysis has marked it
with the keyword “sec-high” as a high-security impactful issue [1].
Requirement ID: 1409649, Prediction: CWE-19 and 399
Remark: The requirement asks to shut down a decoder if a certain parameter is received [1]. The predictions make sense in this regard since a lack of validation for the
parameter would lead to CWE-19 and not responding properly to the received parameter
by shutting down a resource, decoder, might produce a vulnerability of type CWE-399.
Besides, it impacts the source file, HTMLMediaElement.cpp which has been found to be
associated with CVE-2017-5448 and CVE-2015-4509, a vulnerability of type CWE-19 and
CWE-399 respectively.
Requirement ID: 612128, Prediction: CWE-19 and 442
Remark: The requirement asks to take measure against HTML injection through
HTML components. The prediction, CWE-19, is meaningful in this regard since the injection is caused by the lack of input validation. CWE-442 is also relevant as the injection
is carried out through a web interface [1].
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

This thesis proposes a novel framework [23] which aims to provide useful pointer by
predicting typical vulnerabilities encountered in the implementation of a particular requirement. We introduce state-of-the-art machine learning classification algorithms in the prediction module of the framework and investigate their performance in terms of the intended
goal of the framework. To that end, we employ a soft and hard voting-based ensemble of
four classification algorithms such as K-Nearest-Neighbor, Random Forest, Logistic Regression, and Decision Tree in the prediction module. The result indicates that the soft ensemble achieves maximum coverage for the vulnerabilities, while hard ensemble provides
a balanced performance. The hard ensemble is able to capture maximum ‘clean’ requirements with a decent vulnerability coverage, which agrees with the practical scenario. In
practice, the number of ‘clean’ requirements are higher than the requirements ending up
with producing vulnerabilities. One out of every three predictions per requirement is made
accurately in the hard ensemble technique.

5.1

Limitations
Despite the promising result, the framework is far from perfection. For instance, the

CWE security taxonomy by development has some issues. The taxonomy has some cate37

gories which are conceptually similar. For instance, ‘CWE-416’ refers to the use-after-free
scenarios where a reference to the freed memory might be misused for security breaches.
This category has been grouped under the top category ‘Resource Management Errors’
identified as ‘CWE-399’. However, there is another category ‘Expired Pointer Dereference’, ‘CWE-825’ grouped under the top category ‘Pointer Issues’, ‘CWE-465’ which also
refers to a similar situation. In such conflicting cases, the taxonomy provides no objective
guideline to derive a category for a vulnerability in a deterministic way. It is very important for the framework to be able to produce labels for the vulnerabilities in a deterministic
way which can be reproduced. Failure to do so would lead a requirement of a particular
‘original’ label to invade space of other labels. Conceptual invasion of labels undermines
the performance of machine learning classification algorithms.
In this study, a software component or file has acted as a bridge between a requirement
and a vulnerability (cf. Figure 3.4). A drawback with this technique is that a source file
could be very big in scope, i.e., having thousands of lines of code. It could potentially
host many vulnerabilities. However, it is not necessary that the implementation of a certain
requirement should impact every part of a source file. Thus, a requirement might be linked
to the irrelevant vulnerabilities based on the fact that it shares a common source file with
vulnerabilities affecting a different part of the source code. In that regard, the proposed
framework would generate many false labels as it is also indicated by the lower precision
values in our study.
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5.2

Future Work
Based on the findings from our case study on Firefox, we have identified a number of

areas to investigate further in the future to improve the overall quality of the predictions
made by the framework.
1) The poor performance for binary relevance and classifier chain compared to ‘label
powerset’ indicates that there is some sort of correlations among vulnerabilities. In the
future, we plan to investigate along this line to dig out associations among them. Such
association information might provide an important pointer to the security practitioners in
various ways. For instance, it would be useful for a developer to know what other types to
expect when they are fixing the vulnerability of a particular type.
2) Regarding the issue in taking source file as a bridge in building the mapping, we
plan to conduct the experiment by building the mapping at a more granular level, such as
at method level.
3) As it has been pointed out, since accurate labeling of vulnerability would enhance the
performance of the prediction algorithms, we plan to examine other security taxonomies,
such as Seven Pernicious Kingdom [51].
4) Deep learning-based algorithms such as Recurrent Neural Network has achieved
excellent success in addressing many natural language processing tasks for its ability to
learn deep semantic information. As requirements are stated in the natural language, we
plan to explore such techniques in the prediction module to be able to incorporate semantic
and structural information present in requirements.
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